By Nicolás Vargas Varillas
One of the most important news stories of recent weeks was the end of the REINFO (Integral Mining Formalization Registry), announced by Jorge Montero, Minister of Energy and Mines. REINFO, an acronym for the Comprehensive Registry of Mining Formalization, has been an instrument for several years that nominally serves to amalgamate data on individuals engaged in so-called small-scale or artisanal mining, thus providing the state with a mechanism to supervise these individuals' operations in an effort to ensure their practices comply with environmental and safety standards, thus serving as a preliminary step for these individuals to achieve full formalization. However, in practice, REINFO has not been truly useful for this purpose. Unfortunately, this tool has served as a camouflage mechanism for numerous illegal miners, who can hide their evidently unsafe and unsustainable activities as "in the process of formalization," thus serving, strictly speaking, to avoid being viewed by the state as illegal miners.
Following Minister Montero's announcement, protests from the various informal unions, as well as the discontent of those who, to a greater or lesser extent, defend their interests in parliament, erupted on the Peruvian public scene. This not only led to protests in Lima, where various parliamentarians demonstrated their support for the miners' cause, but also resulted in roadblocks nationwide. While we could undertake a long and tedious political analysis of the balance of political forces based on their relationships with illegal unions and how this could translate into electoral results next year, it is also important to highlight not only why REINFO is a clear example of failed public policy, but also whether we can attempt to create a new mechanism that promises a better future.
From the perspective of public administration as a discipline, REINFO is a textbook case of regulatory failure. That is, a state institution or tool that has failed in its role of preventing or mitigating the harm resulting from an activity; and this has occurred, in this case, as a result of the state's inability to protect said institution or tool from being directly affected by the interests of groups whose activities would be affected by appropriate regulatory action. Moving from theory to practice, REINFO as a regulatory tool has failed because, despite its regulatory role, it actually facilitates the hiding of illegal mining under the guise of a mining industry in the process of formalization. en proceso de formalización.
The underlying problem with regulating small-scale mining, however, lies not only in the capture or influence of illegal miners in decision-making processes (through members of Congress, for example), but also in the complexity of having a new, more efficient tool. REINFO, in the end, is nothing more than a registry, which in its purest form is a piece of paper or list naming the individuals engaged in artisanal mining and the area in which they operate. However, it lacks a real oversight capacity for mining activities, both due to the bureaucratic and logistical hurdles involved in having personnel actively supervising activities in, for example, Pataz or La Pampa, and the enormous risk this poses to the safety of the supervisory personnel. Thus, a priori, finding a real and viable alternative to REINFO seems a rather complicated exercise for a public administration already in crisis.
In conclusion, I fear to present REINFO as a sort of vicious circle in which the weak Peruvian public administration has trapped itself. REINFO not only served as a shield for illegal mining but also demonstrated how immensely difficult it would be in Peru to attempt to establish a truly functional regulatory system for small-scale mining. Both regulatory capture and the immense deficiencies in terms of resources and security that the state faces render any alternative to REINFO completely unviable. It will therefore be very important for the next government not only to be able to rein in REINFO, given that it has become clear to all of us in Peru that it is nothing more than a vile cover-up, but also to take into consideration how crucial it is to expand the operational capacity of the various public institutions (why not even with the help of the Armed Forces) in the remote regions where illegal mining operates, where it coexists side by side with economic poverty, food insecurity, and absolute marginalization.
The battle against REINFO can be fought today, but if we don't know what's really behind it, it will be nothing more than an irrelevant skirmish in the long run.