Apex Perú

Power and Succession: Rethinking the Vice Presidency in Peru

By Santiago Bedoya Pardo 

    In recent years, the role of the vice presidency of the republic has taken on unprecedented significance and prominence in Peru's independent history. Whether through the presidential succession triggered by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's resignation in 2018 or Pedro Castillo's removal from office following his attempted coup in 2022, the last decade has seen two instances of presidential succession, facilitating the rise of both Martín Vizcarra and Dina Boluarte to the Government Palace.

    Despite appearing to be commonplace in the eyes of the public, who see it as unlikely that an elected president will be able to complete their term, presidential succession is a “strange” phenomenon since the brief presidency of Serapio Calderón, who succeeded Manuel Cándamo in the early 20th century. Recent years have seen the “normalisation” of a phenomenon that is unusual for our republic, a “normalisation” that makes it worthwhile to rethink the vice-presidential model that governs our country – an exercise that is particularly relevant given the imminent start of the 2026 election campaign.
   As is well known, a presidential ticket is made up of three figures: the president, the first vice president, and the second vice president. During election campaigns, the identities of two-thirds of the presidential ticket tend to be unknown to the overwhelming majority of voters, facilitating not only alienation from the presidential institution in the event of succession, but also a loss of legitimacy on the part of the executive branch. The case of Dina Boluarte's presidency is illustrative of both problems.
   During an “ordinary” five-year presidential term, that is, when the head of the ticket, the president, manages to complete his or her term, the vice-presidencies are rarely centres of political relevance. During the last “ordinary” five-year presidential term, that of Ollanta Humala, this was evident, with the brief exception of the controversies surrounding Omar Chehade's resignation from the second vice-presidency.

   A vice president has no salary or official responsibilities, except for being in charge of the presidential office if the president is out of the country or indisposed (as would be the case, for example, if he needed to undergo surgery). On many occasions, we have seen how the president in office tries to offer a certain degree of stability, both financial and political, to the person occupying this position, either through ministerial appointments or by including the vice president on their parliamentary lists. In the first case, we need only think of the role played by Dina Boluarte at the head of the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion (2021-2022), and in the second case, the parliamentary work of Mercedes Aráoz as a congresswoman for the ‘Peruanos Por el Kambio’ party (2016-2019).

   There are various models in our region that allow us to rethink the role of the vice-presidency. One option, potentially destabilising and populist, would be its abolition. This would respond to the not uncommon call for general elections that is seen with the fall of each directly elected head of state. This was seen, for example, after the rise of Dina Boluarte in December 2022. However, reopening the electoral Pandora's box with the fall of each head of state would lead to a potentially endless cycle of political instability, which would have disastrous effects on private investment in our country.

    There is also the American model, which shares certain similarities with the Argentine model. Eliminating the second vice-presidency, which is itself a historical appendage from the 19th century, and empowering the vice-president as a figure who facilitates dialogue between the executive and the legislative branches, either officially as head of the upper house or as an official spokesperson for the executive branch, a role currently assumed by the prime minister, who should rather fulfil a role as the executive branch's top ‘multi-purpose’ agent.

   The second option would not only institutionalise the figure of the vice-president within our political system but also make it more visible to the public. Introducing the vice president as an active agent in the country's political life would facilitate their acceptance as the legitimate successor to the president in the event of presidential succession, avoiding the erosion of the institutionality of the presidency that we see today under the aforementioned Boluarte.

    At the same time, it could discourage a hostile legislature from seeking presidential vacancy. By allowing the vice president to establish himself as an entity capable of exercising his own political power, establishing an institutionalised political base in his role as spokesperson and coordinator of particular initiatives of the executive, the incentives for the legislature to put him at the head of state as a puppet could be reduced, since he would develop his own political character. By depending on the executive branch to exercise this role, the sole vice president would no longer act as a blank slate for the legislature's particular ambitions, reducing the opportunism associated with presidential vacancy.
    Strengthening the vice presidency through modernisation and reform represents an effort to promote political stability in the country, and after more than 160 years without doing so, it seems that the time has come to rethink its role in the res publica.
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